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To what extent are preferences for risk – 
and for other economic quantities – stable, 
and to what extent are they malleable and 
context-dependent? Judgments and choices 
are strongly influenced by the context of 
available options in both the laboratory 
and the real world (e.g., Parducci, 1995; 
Sharpe et al., 2008), and this applies both 
to choices between risky options and more 
generally (Stewart et al., 2003). What cog-
nitive processes underpin these contex-
tual influences? According to the decision 
by sampling model (DbS: Stewart et al., 
2006), judgments of a stimulus in a con-
text depend solely on the relative ranked 
position of the stimulus within the remem-
bered or experienced context of judgment. 
The claim that only relative ranked position 
matters appears, however, to contradict 
both empirical data and an earlier model 
of judgment, range frequency theory (RFT: 
Parducci, 1965, 1995), according to which 
the position of a stimulus with respect to 
the highest and lowest stimuli in the con-
text (its range position) also matters. Here 
we show that a purely rank-based approach 
can account for apparent range effects 
when the relative memorability of contex-
tual items, as independently determined by 
a memory model (Brown et al., 2007), is 
taken into account.
Such a demonstration is important for 
several reasons. In particular, it is impor-
tant to understand whether the skew of a 
distribution (e.g., the degree of inequality 
of an income distribution) influences the 
judgments of items (e.g., individuals’ own 
incomes) within that distribution. If judg-
ments are based solely on relative rank (as 
DbS claims), there should be no effects of 
distribution skewness – yet such effects 
are frequently observed. For example, 
there is a tension between the claim that 
income inequality within a society influ-
ences various indices of societal well-being 
(e.g., Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009) and the 
claim that individuals are primarily or solely 
concerned with the ranked position of their 
income (Boyce et al., 2010). Here we address 
this tension directly.
The Decision by Sampling model 
assumes that, when making a judgment, 
people draw a sample from memory, the 
choice environment, or both. They then 
compare, ordinally, the to-be-judged stim-
ulus with each sample item. Consider the 
problem of determining one’s wage satis-
faction. According to DbS, one might call 
to mind two individuals who get paid less 
(Nlower = 2), and three individuals who get 
paid more (N
higher
 = 3). That is, one is the 
i’th most highly paid person out of n, where 
i = 3 and n = 6. The resulting estimate of 
one’s relative ranked position, F
i
, is accord-
ing to DbS simply:
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Crucially, such a judgment can be 
based on cognitively basic ordinal binary 
comparisons.
The rank-based process in DbS explains 
how changes in the distribution of contex-
tual items will influence judgment. Consider 
for example a positively skewed set of wages, 
with many relatively low earners and few 
relatively high earners. Such a distribution is 
illustrated in Figure 1A, along with a range-
matched negatively skewed distribution. If 
satisfaction comes from a wage’s relative 
ranked position in its context, the function 
relating satisfaction to wage will be concave 
for a positively skewed distribution, because 
relative ranked position will rise faster with 
income at the lower part of the distribu-
tion. As one moves higher up the positively 
skewed distribution, it becomes progres-
sively more expensive to buy each additional 
increment in relative rank. And indeed, par-
ticipants’ judgments are described by just 
such a concave function, with a correspond-
ing convex function being associated with 
a negatively skewed distribution (Figure 
1C). The judgments are taken from Brown 
et al. (2008) and are here normalized to lie 
between 0 and 1. Figure 1B shows a second 
pair of distributions designed to examine 
relative rank effects – the highlighted item 
pairs have the same absolute value, are 
located in distributions matched for mean 
and endpoints, and hence differ only in 
their relative rank within their respective 
contexts. Again, the satisfaction associated 
with each hypothetical wage is influenced 
by its relative rank (Figure 1D). More gen-
erally, DbS has been used to explain why 
apparent utility curves have the shape they 
do (e.g., the concave relationship between 
utility and money arises because of the posi-
tively skewed distribution of financial gains 
in the environment) and more specifically 
to give a process-level account of why mod-
els such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979), work well descriptively 
(Stewart et al., 2006; Stewart, 2009).
Although numerous studies appear 
consistent with the relative rank princi-
ple in DbS, additional effects of the range 
position of stimuli are often observed. 
DbS was motivated partly by, and inherits 
much of the support for, an earlier – and 
highly  influential – account of contextual 
judgment: RFT. Although less oriented 
toward providing a process-level account, 
and focused more on experimental rather 
than remembered contexts, RFT shares with 
DbS the assumption that the relative ranked 
position of an item within its context will 
affect its judgment. However, unlike DbS, 
RFT predicts that the position of an item 
with respect to the highest and lowest 
stimuli will also affect its judgment. Here 
we aim to reconcile the apparent presence 
of range effects (as postulated by RFT) with 
the purely rank-based processes of DbS. In 
RFT, Mi, the subjective psychological mag-
nitude of x
i
, (where x
i
 is the ith largest in a 
set of n stimuli) will be given by:
M wR w Fi i i= + −( )1  
(2)
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position of the stimulus. In Eq. 2, w is a 
weighting parameter which is often estimated 
at approximately 0.5 for physical judgments.
Range frequency theory has been highly 
successful as a descriptive account of judg-
ments in context (Parducci, 1995). However, 
an important part of RFT’s success comes 
from its inclusion of a range-based as well as 
by Eq. 1 above (although DbS assumes a 
retrieved rather than experimentally pro-
vided context).
Thus (according to RFT), the subjective 
magnitude of a stimulus in a context will 
depend on (a) the position of the stimulus 
along a line joining the lowest and highest 
points in the set and (b) the rank ordered 
where R
i
 is the range value of x
i
:
R
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x xi
i
n
=
−
−
1
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and F
i
 is the relative ranked ordinal posi-
tion (or “frequency value”) of the item in 
the ordered set, as used in DbS and given 
Figure 1 | Comparison of the predictions of rFT and the combined 
DbS-SiMPLe model (see text for details). (A) Positively and negatively 
skewed wage distributions. (B) Bimodal and unimodal wage distributions. 
(C,D) Fit of RFT and DbS-SIMPLE to wage satisfaction judgments. (e,F) 
Predictions of DbS-SIMPLE model with high memory discriminability,  
and fit of RFT to those predictions. (g,H) Predictions of DbS-SIMPLE model 
with low memory discriminability, and fit of RFT to those  
predictions.
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c = 2.11, t = 0.47, s = 4.24 for all four (posi-
tive, negative, unimodal and bimodal) 
distributions. Despite not including any 
range-based component, the model fits the 
data as well as does RFT (solid green line) 
– fits were not statistically distinguishable 
on the illustrative data, although we note 
that the combined model has additional 
parameters. The reason for the combined 
model’s behavior is as stated above – the 
items in relatively crowded regions of 
stimulus space are less distinctive and 
hence contribute less to the rank-based 
comparison process in DbS than they 
would if they were equally likely to enter 
(or carried equal weight within) the 
sample.
To explore the combined (SIMPLE + DbS) 
model, we derived its predictions under 
various assumptions about memory dis-
criminability, then examined how well RFT 
would fit the model’s behavior. We first set 
c to a large number, with the result that all 
items could be perfectly discriminated and 
all contributed to the rank-based judg-
ment. Results are shown in Figures 1E,F, 
where it is evident that strong rank effects 
are produced – as expected, because items 
are equally discriminable and all contribute 
to judgment. The solid lines show the SSE-
minimizing fit of RFT to the data generated 
from the model; the estimated value of w 
was 0 (i.e., RFT accommodated the fact that 
only rank-based comparison occurred).
Figures 1G,H show the predictions of 
the model when c = 1.8 (left column) and 
1.6 (right column). Parameters t and s were 
set at 0.8 and 5 respectively for both pairs 
of distributions. The best-fitting version of 
RFT estimated w = 0.95, indicating that the 
output of the rank-based model was inter-
preted by RFT as a predominantly range-
based model.
In summary, apparent range effects can 
emerge from a purely rank-based judgment 
model when item discriminability is accom-
modated. Thus apparent range effects need 
not support RFT over purely rank-based 
accounts. Moreover, effects of distribution 
skew (e.g., income inequality) need not be 
inconsistent with the operation of purely 
rank-based judgments. Finally, we note 
that although the SIMPLE + DbS model 
behaves similarly to RFT under the condi-
tions described above, the models are not 
formally identical and can make different 
predictions.
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where η
i,j
 is the similarity between items 
i and j and d
i,j
 the distance between them 
(here, the distance along the dimension of 
judgment that separates the two items – 
e.g., a difference in wages). We assume that 
the probability of an item being included 
in a sample used for judgment will depend 
on its retrievability. In SIMPLE, the retriev-
ability of an item will depend on its dis-
criminability, where the discriminability 
of item i is inversely proportional to its 
summed similarity to every other poten-
tially available stimulus. Specifically, the 
discriminability of the trace for item i, D
i
, 
is given by:
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where n is the number of available 
response alternatives (this will be just the 
number of available potential comparison 
stimuli). Discriminability is converted into 
predicted recall probability by taking into 
account the possibility of omissions. If D
i
 
is the discriminability given by the pre-
ceding equation, the recall probability P
i
 
is given by:
P
e
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where t is the threshold (such that if dis-
criminability is below a threshold an item 
cannot be retrieved) and s determines the 
slope of the transforming function (effec-
tively, how noisy the omission threshold is).
We now illustrate, using the wage sat-
isfaction data, how a DbS model can give 
rise to apparent range effects when supple-
mented by this model of memory distinc-
tiveness and retrieval. The model assumes 
that the probability of each item being 
included in the sample that determines 
judgment is predictable from the SIMPLE 
model (Eqs 5–7 above). The satisfaction 
with each wage was assumed to be based 
purely on the relative rank of each wage 
within its context (as in Eq. 1), but with 
each item weighted by the probability of it 
being included in the sample.
The fit of the model to the wage satis-
faction data (Figures 1C,D) is shown as 
a dashed red line. Parameter values were 
a  rank-based component. For example, the 
solid green lines in Figures 1C,D show the fit 
of RFT to the wage satisfaction judgments. The 
estimated values of w that led to this fit were 
0.32 (C) and 0.43 (D), suggesting that both 
range and rank affect judgment (see Eq. 2).
It might therefore appear to be a serious 
limitation of DbS that it predicts only effects 
of relative rank and not additional effects 
of range (and hence, as noted earlier, of 
skew). Here, however, we argue that appar-
ent range effects could reflect the reduced 
psychophysical discriminability of items in 
relatively crowded regions of psychological 
space, as predicted by models of memory. 
For example, the SIMPLE model of memory 
(Brown et al., 2007) views memory retrieval 
as a discrimination task. An important 
dimension along which discrimination 
occurs is assumed to be temporal (Brown 
et al., 2009), as is needed to explain forget-
ting, but here we focus on the dimension 
along which judgment must be made (e.g., 
the amount of a wage). Central to the model 
is the notion of distinctiveness (intuitively: 
items are viewed as distinctive, and hence 
discriminable in and retrievable from mem-
ory, to the extent that they occupy relatively 
isolated locations in multidimensional psy-
chological space).
We first provide an intuitive example. 
Consider the median wage (20) highlighted 
in the following context of wages: [5 10 15 20 
23 24 25]. If all contextual items are included 
in the sample, the relative ranked position of 
20 will be 0.5 [Nlower/(Nhigher + Nlower) = 3/6]. 
Suppose however that the three wages above 
the median are less distinctive in memory 
(because they are close to one another), 
and that each has a probability of being 
included in the sample of just 0.5. The 
judgment of the median wage will then be 
(N
lower
)/(N
higher
 + N
lower
) = 3/4.5 = 0.67. This 
falls between the relative ranked position 
of 20 (which was 0.5) and the range posi-
tion of 20 (which, by Eq. 3, is 0.75). Thus, 
a purely rank-based account such as DbS 
may be able to account for apparent range 
effects when the distinctiveness and hence 
availability in memory of contextual items 
is incorporated. We illustrate with a basic 
implemented model.
According to the SIMPLE model, the 
confusability of any two items in memory 
will be a reducing exponential function of 
the distance between them in psychologi-
cal space:
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